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PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF ARBITRATION
OSMOND K. FRAENKELt
There are three entirely separate and distinct procedural phases con-
nected with arbitration. Two of these form part of legal proceedings-the
steps necessary to obtain an arbitration and those required to enforce an
award. The remaining, and perhaps the most important phase, is that of
the proceedings before the arbitrators themselves.
No discussion of the subject is clear, however, without a reference to
the various different kinds of arbitration which co-exist in most states and
also to the great variety in the form of the statutes in force in various juris-
dictions. Arbitrations may be classified as common law or statutory, revo-
cable or irrevocable, voluntary or compulsory. It is important also to bear
in mind that agreements to arbitrate future controversies are in most
jurisdictions subject to rules quite different from those which govern agree-
ments to arbitrate an existing dispute. At common law arbitration received
little aid from the courts until after award,' and even then it was necessary
to bring an action for the enforcement of the award. 2 Very early in the
history of many of the states this was changed, so that if certain formalities
had been complied with the award could be enforced by judgment obtained
by summary proceedings. 3 Almost all of the states now have such laws.
Under many such statutes if an agreement to arbitrate an existing contro-
versy is in the form required by law, an attempt by one of the parties to
revoke is prohibited, and judgment will be entered upon the award.4 Until
comparatively recent times, however, such agreements could be revoked in
t A. B., 1907, as of i9o8; A. M., i9o8, Harvard University; LL. B., 19I1, Columbia Uni-
versity; member of the New York Bar; author of THE SAcco-VANzErrI CASE (1931) ; THE
CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS ay Louis D. BRANDEIS (1934) ; The New York
Arbitration Law (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 623; The Supreme Court and the Taxing Power of
the States (1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 612, and numerous other articles in various periodicals.
I. It was generally held that until an award had been rendered either party could revoke.
For discussion of English cases see CoHax, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1918)
205-225. This doctrine was followed in the United States. Insurance Company v. Morse, 2o
Wall. 445 (U. S. 1874). Under certain conditions today, however, breach of a contract for
arbitration may be pleaded in bar to an action. McCullough v. Clinch-Mitchell Construction
Company, 71 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). A similar result has been reached on the
ground that a general arbitration statute had declared a policy favorable to arbitration, even
though the agreement did not conform to the statute. See Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean and
Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 68o (1925) ; Zindorf Construction Co. v. Western Ameri-
can Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 Pac. 374 (9O).
2. See Nay v. Boston, etc. R. R., 192 Mass. 517, 78 N. E. 547 (19o6) ; Rank v. Hill, 2
W. & S. 56 (Pa. 1841). See also cases cited infra, note 112.
3. Examples of statutes so providing are: N. Y. Civ. PRAcT. ACT (Cahill, 1931) §§ 1448-
1469; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 5, §§ 1-7.
4. The Uniform Arbitration Act is a statute of this type. It has been enacted in Nevada,
NEv. Comp. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 510-534; North Carolina, N. C. CODE (1931) § 898 (a)-
(x) ; Utah, UTAH REV. STAT. (1933) tit. 104, c. 36, §§ 1-22; and Wyoming, Wyo. REV. STAT.
(1931) c. 7, §§ 101-124. For the states which also make agreements to arbitrate future con-
troversies irrevocable, see infra, note 6.
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some jurisdictions.' It was not until 192o that any state also enforced agree-
ments to arbitrate future controversies, and even now only thirteen states
have enacted such laws.0
The first things a lawyer must know, of course, are when and how he
can compel arbitration and what to do if his opponent has brought an action
in violation of an arbitration agreement. This paper will not concern itself
with a discussion of when arbitration may be obtained nor of the issues which
may be submitted to it. These subjects have been extensively treated else-
where, 7 and are also discussed in other articles in this issue of the REVIEW.
I
An arbitration may be initiated in several ways.8 If no antecedent
agreement exists the consent of the parties is necessary in order to institute
arbitration effectively. In nearly all jurisdictions, despite various statutory
forms of arbitration, the parties may, if they prefer, carry on a common law
proceeding. This method has but one advantage, namely, that no formal
5. When a submission has been made a rule of court it is irrevocable without
leave of the court. See Bray v. English, I Conn. 498 (1816) ; Haskell v. Whitney, 12 Mass.
47 (I8I5) ; Zehner v. Lehigh Coal Company, 187 Pa. 487, 41 Atl. 464 (1898). In some juris-
dictions agreements to arbitrate have been held irrevocable once the arbitrators have been
sworn, on the ground that the common law right of revocation was inconsistent with the
scheme of arbitration set up in the statute, although there was nothing on the subject-of revo-
cation in the law. See Shroyer v. Bash, 57 Ind. 349 (1877) ; Carey v. Montgomery County,
ig Ohio 245 (1850). Until ig2o N. Y. CODE OF CIrv. Paoc. (Parsons, 19II) § 2383 expressly
permitted revocation under certain circumstances. See also D. & H. Canal Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co., 5o N. Y. 250 (1872). As to revocability under thef Pennsylvania law see
Buckwalter v. Russell, i19 Pa. 495, 13 AtI. 31o (1888).
6. Arizona, Ariz. Laws 1929, c. 72; California, CAL. CODE OF CIV. PR0C. (Deering,
1931) §§ 1280-1293; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5840-5856; Louisiana, LA.
GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§ 405-422; Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 251, §§ 14-
22; New Hampshire, N. H. Laws 1929, c. 147; New Jersey, N. J. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1924)
§§ 9:21-36; New York, N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (ig2) §§ I-I0; Ohio, Ohio Laws 1931, no.
41, p. 137; Oregon, ORE. CODE (1930) §§ 21:101-113; Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANi. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 5, §§ 161-181; Rhode Island, R. I. Laws 1929, c. 1408; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
(1931) C. 298.01-18. A similar law has been enacted by the United States, 43 STAT. 883-886
(1925), 9 U. S. C. A. §§ I-I 5 (1927).
7. STURGES, Coz iemRcrAL ARITRATIONS AND AwARs (1930); CODE OF ARBITRATION OF
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL (1931) ; Bulletins of the American Arbitration Serv-
ice, issued monthly (1931 to 1933) ; Fraenkel, The New York Arbitrationt Laun (1932) 32
COL. L. REv. 623. Mr. Philip G. Phillips has written a number of challenging articles in
which various existing doctrines are criticized. See Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitratiot
Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1258;
Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Comnercial Arbitration (934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 590; Cor-
inercial Arbitration under the N. R. A. (1934) I U. OF CHI. L. REv. 424; A Practical Method
for the Determination of Buinwss Fact (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. :23o; Arbitrationi and
Conflicts of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsiom (1934) 19-CORN. L. Q. 197.
8. Much of the following analysis is drawn from the writer's experience in New York
practice. The rules vary greatly from state to state, and cannot be generalized. Particular
statutes and decisions must be consulted.
9. Modern System Bakery v. Salisbury, 215 Ky. 230, 284 S. W. 994 (1926) ; Fidelity and
Deposit Co. of Md. v. Woltz, 234 App. Div. 823, 253 N. Y. Supp. 583 (4th Dep t 1931);
Isaac v. Donegal & Conoy Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 301 Pa. 351, 152 At. 95 (1930) ; see also cases
cited infra, note 112. However, in Washington it has been held that the statute has abolished
the common law proceeding. Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Construction and Engineering Co., 92
Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129 (1916) ; Smith v. Department of Labor and Industries, 30 P. (2d)
656 (Wash. 1934).
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agreement is necessary and that even an oral agreement may be sufficient.10
However, if the parties desire to secure the right summarily to enter judg-
ment on the award, they must comply strictly with the formalities required
by the law of the state to whose courts they expect to apply.
These formalities vary considerably. In some states the agreement
must be made an order of the court." And there is difference of opinion
as to the sufficiency of substantial compliance with the law.' 2  In other states
it is fatal if the agreement contains clauses not contemplated by the statute,
as, for instance, that the award may be final.13  This may also be true if the
agreement omits provisions required by law, as when it does not provide for
the naming of the arbitrators 14 or for the entry of judgment,"3 or does not
sufficiently define the controversy. 16 In many jurisdictions the agreement
must be acknowledged in the manner required for recording deeds 17 and
any slight defect will be sufficient to prevent summary enforcement of the
award.' Care should therefore be taken to comply strictly with the requisite
formalities. Elsewhere, the only requirement is that the agreement be in
writing and signed by the parties. 19
If, however, a contract to arbitrate future controversies exists in a
jurisdiction which enforces such contracts, then no formal agreement is
io. See Smith-Schultz-Hodo Realty Co. v. Henley-Spurgeon Realty Co., 224 Ala. 331,
140 So. 443 (1932); Dinerstein v. Shapiro, 147 Misc. 37, 262 N. Y. Supp. 461 (Sup. Ct.
1933). But if the subject matter of the arbitration is an interest in real estate the award,
even at common law, had to be in writing. See French v. New, 28 N. Y. 147 (1863).
iI. FLA. Co-ip. LAWS (927) § 4552; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1934) § 928.
12. In Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 49 Idaho 303, 288 Pac.
641 (193o), it was held sufficient for the clerk to file the agreement. Cf. Richards v. Smith,
33 Utah 8, 91 Pac. 683 (19o7). Contra: Payne v. McElya, go Fla. 900, 107 So. 241 (1925);
Steel v. Steel, I Nev. 27 (1865).
13. Cochrane v. Forbes, 257 Mass. 135, I53 N. E. 566 (1926). The new law enacted in
1925 has probably changed the rule in this case. See also Kreiss v. Hotaling, 96 Cal. 617, 31
Pac. 740 (1892); Joshua Hendy Machine Works v. Gray, 9 Cal. App. 61o, 99 Pac. 1O
(19o8).
14. Kreiss v. Hotaling, 96 Cal. 617, 31 Pac. 740 (1892). See also Joshua Hendy Ma-
chine Works v. Gray, 9 Cal. App. 6io, 99 Pac. iiio (i9o8).
I5. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 59 F. (2d) io38 (App. D. C.
1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 626 (1932). Contra: City of Rahway v. Cleary, io N. J. Misc.
545, 159 Atl. 813 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, io9 N. J. L. 348, 162 Atl. 590 (1932), sub nor. Rah-
way Valley Joint Meeting v. Cleary.
16. See Putterman v. Schmidt, 209 Wis. 442, 245 N. W. 78 (1932).
17. IOWA CODE (1931) § 12696; ME. Ray. STAT. (i930) c. 122, § I; MICH. COMP. LAws
(1929) § 15396; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9514; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) C. 20, § 2105;
N. M. STAT. (1929) § 5:105; N. Y. CIV. PRAcT. Acr (Cahill, 1931) § 1449.
I8. In re Ames-Farmer Canning Co., i9O Iowa 1259, 179 N. W. 105 (192o) (notary dis-
qualified as being a stockholder of one of the parties) ; Koht v. Towne, 2oi Iowa 538, 207 N.
W. 596 (1926) (notary failed to affix seal) ; Burkland v. Johnson, 5o Neb. 858, 70 N. W. 388
(1897); Matter of Buckley v. Lippman, 223 N. Y. 539, 119 N. E. 1O33 (I918) (judgment
confirming award set aside at request of party who participated in )hearing, there being a de-
fect in his own acknowledgment). See also Bender v. Bloom, 223 App. Div. 644, 229 N. Y.
Supp. 155 (1st Dep't 1928) ; Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Janan, Inc., 224 App.
Div. 26, 229 N. Y. Supp. 338 (1st Dep't 1928) ; Matter of Colwell Worsted Mills v. Glass,
228 App. Div. 150, 239 N. Y. Supp. 281 (ist Dep't 193o).
19. See UNIFORm ARBITRATION AcT, enacted in states listed supra note 4.
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required.20  Sometimes it is preferable to execute such formal agreement in
order to define the controversy, to indicate an approval of the chosen arbitra-
tors, or to limit their procedure. Accordingly, the rules of some organiza-
tions sponsoring arbitration require the execution of such agreement,
notwithstanding the enforceability of the basic contract. Care should be
taken to see that the formal agreement conforms to all statutory require-
ments, as the courts may hold that the award rests upon it, rather than upon
the original contract to arbitrate future controversies. 21
It is advisable, and perhaps even essential, to demand arbitration as soon
as the controversy arises. 22  This should be done by calling to the attention
of the other side the existence of the arbitration agreement, declaring the
willingness of one's own client to arbitrate, and calling upon the other side
to do whatever is required by the agreement. This step will sometimes result
in a consent to arbitrate. A consent informally expressed in a letter is then
sufficient to set the machinery of arbitration in action.
Should he fail to secure consent, the person desiring to arbitrate may
in the "compulsory states" apply to the court for an order compelling arbi-
tration,23 or, under some statutes, may proceed to invoke the machinery
provided for by the contract. 24  This last method is available only where,
under the contract, no steps need be taken by the recalcitrant party. It is
useless when the agreement calls for the appointment of arbitrators by the
parties themselves, or when it gives to the recalcitrant party a choice of
arbitration tribunals, unless a method of forfeiting the choice be provided.
The New York statute authorizes holding an arbitration without first
obtaining a court order, but in such event also permits the defeated party to
20. Matter of Yeannakopoulos, 195 App. Div. 261, 186 N. Y. Supp. 457 (ist Dep't 1921) ;
Matter of Hines v. Ziegfeld, 222 App. Div. 543, 226 N. Y. Supp. 562 (Ist Dep't 1928). In-
deed, under the New York statute is has been held that it is not necessary for the agreement
to be signed by the parties. Japan Cotton Trading Co., Ltd. v. Farber, 233 App. Div. 354, 253
N. Y. Supp. 290 (Ist Dep't 1931).
21. See Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Janan, Inc., 224 App. Div. 26, 229 N.
Y. Supp. 338 (Ist Dep't 1928).
22. See CODE OF ARBITRATION OF THE AmERIcAN ARBITRATION TRUUXAL (I93I) 65; Cal-
ifornia XValnut Growers' Ass'n v. Muller, N. Y. L. J., Feb. IS, 1926, at 2o18.
23. E. g., N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1921) §3; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 5,
§163; 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9U. S. C. A. §4 (1927).
24. The UNIFORm ARBITRATION AcT, § 7, expressly provides that upon the non-appear-
ance of one of the parties a default may be taken. Presumably this would authorize the con-
duct of an arbitration in accordance with the agreement, despite the attempt by one of the par-
ties to withdraw. Other states have similar specific authorizations for proceeding on default.
See, C. g., MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 251, § 18. In New York after a decision indicating that
an arbitration could not proceed without court order where one of the arbitrators Withdrew,
Matter of Bullard v. Grace Co., Inc., 24o N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559 (1925), the law was
amended by the addition of § 4-a. This clause permits a party who has not participated in
the hearings to procure a determination whether there was a contract for arbitration or a de-
fault in compliance therewith, or whether the arbitrators had acted pursuant to the contract.
The statute was interpreted to preserve the same right to a party who, having participated in
the arbitration, had seasonably raised the jurisdictional questions, except that in such case
there is no right to a jury trial. So construed, it was held constitutional. Matter of Fin-
silver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., Inc., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930).
See Phillips, supra note 7, i9 CORN. L. Q. at 222-223.
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contest the obligation to arbitrate when he is served with the motion to
confirm the award, -5 even though he has participated in the arbitration itself.
Accordingly, such a procedure is undesirable in view of the possibility of
subsequent opposition. It is to be recommended only when quick action is
desired even at the risk of its later proving abortive, or when an order cannot
be obtained because the opposing party is a non-resident.2  No other state
has a similar provision, and the question does not appear to have arisen else-
where. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that a party abstaining
from the hearings could, upon confirmation of the award, question the
making of the agreement, since without a valid agreement there is no juris-
dictional basis for the summary entry of judgment by the court.
In the ordinary case where no consent is forthcoming, a court order
should, therefore, be obtained before proceeding with the arbitration. By
this means, any issue as to the right to compel the arbitration will be finally
disposed of before the arbitration itself is held, since the court will not, on
application to confirm an award, review an order compelling arbitration. 7
These observations apply with equal force to the case where a party, although
originally consenting, refuses to go ahead with the arbitration.
Many modern arbitration statutes contemplate summary proceedings
instituted by petition and notice of motion returnable within a short time. 28
The proceedings must be instituted by service such as is required for a sum-
mons in an action. 29  Except when the arbitration agreement is formal and
not subject to any possible dispute, it is wise to set it forth in the petition in
full. In practice it has proven desirable to annex photostatic copies of the
agreement in order to prevent the other party from resorting to ambiguous
denials. And it is, of course, essential to state in the petition that there is
a controversy,30 and to describe it in sufficient detail to make clear that it is
25. See N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1921) § 4-a, and discussion thereof supra note 24.
26. See Phillips, supra note 7, 19 CORN. L. Q. at 223-228, pointing out complications where
the contract does not specify where the arbitration is to be held.
27. Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386
(1929). There is an intimation in that case that the original order might be reviewed if there
was total lack of jurisdiction to make it. But cf. Petition of Jardine, Matheson & Co., 280
Pac. 397 (Cal. App. 1929).
28. N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1921) § 3 (eight days' notice); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 5, § 163 (five days' notice) ; 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. A. §4 (1927) (five
days' notice). The Massachusetts law making agreements to arbitrate future controversies
enforceable and irrevocable provides no summary method for its enforcement, but does, under
§ 15, provide for an application to the court for the appointment of arbitrators when neces-
sary. The Uniform Arbitration Act, which applies only to submissions to arbitrate existing
controversies, likewise has no express provision for the enforcement of such agreements, but
does provide, in §§ 3, 5, for summary applications for the appointment of arbitrators when
necessary.
29. N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1921) §3; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) § 163; 43
STAT. 883 (I925), 9 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1927). For application of the statute to a foreign cor-
poration see Matter of Biddle Purchasing Co., Inc. v. Yung Hsing Trading Corp., 238 App.
Div. 264, 264 N. Y. Supp. 157 (Ist Dep't 1933).
30. See Matter of Webster v. Varx Allen, 217 App. Div. 219, 216 N. Y. Supp. 552 (4th
Dep't 1926) ; Newburger v. Lubell, 257 N. Y. 383, 178 N. E. 669 (93). In accordance with
the rule laid down by these cases it would appear that arbitration may not be used to obtain
judgment by default. Consequently, if no controversy is alleged or if respondent admits the
contentions of petitioner, the proceeding must be dismissed and the parties left to their action
at law.
230
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covered by the clause of the agreeement. 31 It is not, however, necessary to
state the facts as formally as they would be stated in an ordinary pleading.
So long as there is a bona fide controversy the courts will not refuse arbitra-
tion." However, there have been intimations that arbitration might be
refused should it appear that, because the claim of one party is indisputable,
no controversy actually exists. 33 It is good practice, although perhaps not
necessary, to allege that the party seeking the order has offered to submit to
arbitration and that the other party has refused.
If an action has been commenced by the recalcitrant party it may,
according to various arbitration statutes, be stayed.34  In New York the
application for a stay may be made only in the Supreme Court 3 and may
not be made in the action itself,36 but should be part of a proceeding to compel
arbitration. The petition in such cases should set forth enough information
about the action to indicate that its subject matter comes within the arbitra-
tion agreement. Most states, however, permit the stay to be granted in the
action itself.
37
Service of the arbitration papers on the respondent personally may not
be necessary in New York in cases where an action has been brought, since
the attorneys who have brought the action usually accept service. Moreover,
as the statute does not require personal service in order to obtain a stay,
service on the attorney is probably legally sufficient, at least for that purpose,
and it might be difficult for an attorney to raise the technical point of non-
service of the client himself. In the writer's experience, service has generally
31. The court will always determine whether the controversy alleged in the petition comes
within the scope of the agreement. See Matter of Kelley v. Bauer, 24o N. Y. 74, 147 N. E.
363 (1925) ; Matter of Buxton v. Mallery, 245 N. Y. 337, 157 N. E. 259 (1927) ; Buccini v.
Paterno Construction Co., 253 N. Y. 256, 17o N. E. 91o (193o) ; Matter of Rieb, 2o5 App.
Div. 517, 199 N. Y. Supp. 704 (Ist Dep't 1923) ; Matter of Goldberg Enterprises, Inc., 130
Misc. 887, 225 N. Y. Supp. 513 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd, 222 App. Div. 729, 225 N. Y. Supp.
909 (Ist Dep't 1927). The construction of the contract will, however, be a question for arbi-
tration when the issue is whether there was a breach of the obligation of the contract. Mat-
ter of Fabricand v. Nortz, 252 N. Y. 524, I7a N. E. 129 (1929) ; Itoh & Co., Ltd. v. Boyer
Oil Co., Inc., 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N. Y. Supp. 290 (Ist Dep't 1921); Matter of Hines v.
Ziegfeld, 222 App. Div. 543, 226 N. Y. Supp. 562 (Ist Dep't 1928) ; Matter'of Pine Street
Realty Co., Inc. v. Coutroulos, 233 App. Div. 404, 253 N. Y. Supp. 174 (Ist Dep't 1931).
32. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 7o F. (2d) 297 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1934) ; Matter of Wenger & Co., Inc. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 239 N. Y.
199, 146 N. E. 203 (924).
33. See cases cited in note 32, supra.
34. N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1g2i) § 5; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 5, § 162;
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 251, §21; 43 STAT. 883 (925), 9 U. S. C. A. §3 (927). The
Uniform Arbitration Act has no provision on this subject. See Phillips, supra note 7, 19
CORN. L. Q. at 199-2o8.
35. See Matter of Kipp v. Hamburg-American Line, 134 Misc. 481 (N. Y. City Ct.
1929), aff'd, 228 App. Div. 802, 239 N. Y. Supp. 914 (Ist Dep't 1929) ; Matter of Chapman
Kruge Corp. v. Jaffe, 239 App. Div. 795, 263 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dep't 1933). In New Jer-
sey there is a similar limitation.
36. See Gold v. Newburger, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 20, I93o, at 1963; Newburger v. Coutinho,
N. Y. L. J., April 28, 1931, at 551.
37. In Massachusetts the language of the statute (§ 21) would indicate that an applica-
tion for a stay might be brought in the action itself. The Federal Arbitration Act (§ 3) and
the Pennsylvania statute (§ 162) expressly provide for the granting of a stay by the court in
which the action is pending.
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been made on the attorneys in such instances. In one or two cases the
attorneys attempted to question the service but never pressed the point. It
is, of course, risky for an attorney to press such a point because he must
appear specially in order to do so and may, if his objection is overruled, lose
the opportunity of opposing the application on its merits. This can happen
because the whole matter is generally submitted to the court at one time, and
if the attorney touches on the merits at all he will be deemed to have appeared
generally in accordance with the general rule on that subject.
Usually the application for a stay will be granted or denied in the same
fashion as the application to compel the arbitration itself. There are, how-
ever, cases in which the courts will stay an action even though they cannot
grant arbitration, as when an agreement provides for arbitration outside of
the jurisdiction of the court.38
The respondent in answer to the petition must set forth his position.
The facts should be stated very much as in response to a motion for summary
judgment, so as to show that an issue of fact exists which warrants a hearing.
The better practice seems to be to submit both an answer to the petition and
an affidavit setting forth the facts. Mere denials or affirmations that are
but conclusions are insufficient. 39  Of course, this is not necessary if
respondent raises legal questions which arise on the face of the petition, such
as the sufficiency of the agreement relied on or that the issue does not come
within the terms of the agreement.
It does not always follow that a hearing will be ordered because factual
contentions are raised by respondent. The moving party may concede the
facts and contend that they are irrelevant, and therefore urge that he is none
the less entitled to a summary determination of the motion. When, how-
ever, relevant issues of fact are raised the court cannot summarily determine
38. See Matter of Inter-Ocean Food Products, Inc., 206 App. Div. 426, 201 N. Y. Supp.
536 (ist Dep't 1923) ; Estate Property Corp. v. Hudson Coal Co., 132 Misc. 590, 230 N. Y.
Supp. 372 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 225 App. Div. 798, 232 N. Y. Supp. 739 (ist Dep't 1929) ;
Danielson v. Entre Rios Ry., 22 F. (2d) 326 (D. Md. 1927). Contra: The Silverbrook, 18
F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La. 1927). On the question whether arbitration will be ordered where it
is to be held outside the jurisdiction of the court see Matter of California Packing Corp., 121
Misc. 212, 201 N. Y. Supp. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (application denied) ; Matter of Marchant
v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 293, 169 N. E. 386, 389 (1929) (doubt expressed
on the subject) ; Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas Corp., 313 Pa. 442, 17o Atl.
286 (1934) (application granted). There is discussion of the subject also in Shanferoke
Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Service Corp., 70 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). See
also Katakura & Company, Ltd. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., 307 Pa. 544, 161 Atl. 529 (1932).
In New Jersey it has been expressly held that arbitration may be ordered wherever the con-
tract calls for it on the ground that the New Jersey statute authorizes the enforcement of an
agreement, according to its terms: California Lima Bean Growers' Ass'n v. Mankowitz, 9 N.
J. Misc. 362, 154 Atl. 532 (Cir. Ct. ig3i). It should be noted, however, that both the federal
statute (§ 4) and the New York statute (§ 3) contain similar language, namely, that the or-
der direct "that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for" in the agreement. See
Phillips, supra note 7, 19 CoRx. L. Q. at 218-222.
39. See Berizzi Bros. v. Krawitz, N. Y. L. J., May 13, 1933, at 290o; Matter of New-
burger v. Hatry Holding Corp., N. Y. L. J., March 21, 1934, at 136o, aff'd, 241 App. Div. 853
(Ist Dep't 1934).
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the matter.40  An order must be entered providing for a hearing. Most
statutes permit either party to demand a jury if respondent claims that no
agreement to arbitrate was ever made.41  Such a demand must be made
befo-c the issues are submitted upon the return of the application or it will be
deemed to have been waived. 42  The hearing should be held promptly. The
order for a hearing should frame the issues which are to be tried and, where
calendar practice permits, direct that the issue be placed at the head of the
day calendar for a definite day, thus obviating delays.
43
When a question of fact is set down for trial either with or without a
jury the court may deny the arbitration without prejudice to its renewal after
the trial of the issue of fact,4 4 or it may make its decision upon the original
application contingent upon the result of the trial.4" This second form of
order, although perhaps somewhat cumbersome in language, saves the party
the necessity of making a second application to the court and also removes
uncertainties as to the failure to appeal from the original order. For instance,
in a case within the writer's experience, an order was entered denying the
motion to compel arbitration without prejudice to its renewal after a jury
trial; the jury trial was held and resulted in a decision favorable to the
petitioner. Then a new motion was made to compel arbitration, and respond-
ent presented certain legal objections to the petitioner's right to compel
arbitration. Petitioner successfully contended that these objections had been
disposed of by the first order, and, as no appeal had been taken, that they
constituted the law of the case.40  The matter was never passed on by a
40. N. Y. ARBITRATIoN LAW (1921) § 3; PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 5, § 163;
43 STAT. 883 (925), 9 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1927). For applications of this section see Matter of
Palmer & Pierce, Inc., ig App. Div. 523, 186 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Ist Dep't 1921) ; Matter of
Gresham & Co., Ltd., 202 App. Div. 211, 195 N. Y. Supp. io6 (Ist Dep't 1922); Matter of
Cyrus Tung Fang, 227 App. Div. 766 (Ist Dep't 1929) ; Matter of Newburger v. Gold, 229
App. Div. 572, 243 N. Y. Supp. 51 (Ist Dep't I93O), aff'd, 255 N. Y. 532, 175 N. E. 3o1
(193o) ; cf. Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., Inc., 253 N. Y.
382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930). See also California Lima Bean Growers' Association v. Manko-
witz, 9 N. J. Misc. 362, 154 Atl. 532 (Cir. Ct. 193).
41. CAL. CODE OF CirV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 1282; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 407;
N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 9:23; N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW (1921) § 3; Ohio Laws
1931, no. 41, P. 137; ORE. CODE (193o) § 21:103; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 5,
§ 163; R. I. Laws 1929, c. 1408, § 3; WIS. STAT. (1931) c. 298.03; 43 STAT. 883 (I925), 9 U.
S. C. A. § 4 (1927).
42. See Matter of Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. King, 144 Misc. 708 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1932).
43. Such practice was adopted in the cases of Matter of Newburger v. Gold (order
April 30, 193o, New York County Supreme Court Index #2512-1930) ; Matter of Newbur-
ger v. Benjamin (order May 3, 1933, New York County Supreme Court Index #10733-1933).
44. This was done in Matter of Newburger v. Gold, 229 App. Div. 572, 243 N. Y. Supp.
51 (Ist Dept i93O), aff'd, 255 N. Y. 532, 175 N. E. 3Ol (.i93o). While a point was made of
the form of the order, this was not discussed in the opinions.
45. Such was the form of the order in Japan Trading Cotton Co., Ltd. v. Farber, 233
App. Div. 354, 253 N. Y. Supp. 290 (Ist Dep't '931). A similar order was entered in Matter
of Newburger v. Scharf (New York County Supreme Court Index #14265-193o). In Mat-
ter of Newburger v. Perlitch (New York County Supreme Court Index #10733-1933), the
application was held in abeyance pending the jury trial; upon a verdict in favor of petitioners
an order was entered granting the original motion.
46. Matter of Newburger v. Fichtenbaum (New York County Supreme Court Index
#2511-193o). A similar situation existed in Matter of Newburger v. Gold (New York
County Supreme Court Index #2512-1930). The appeal to which reference has been made,
supra note 44, was taken by petitioners.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
higher court, but it is clear that had an order in the contingent form been
entered, respondent would have had to make all of his objections at the one
time or appeal from the contingent order if dissatisfied.
In many states appeals may be taken from an order granting or denying
an application to compel arbitration.47  Where there has been a preliminary
trial the appeal will bring up for review any errors committed at such trial,4s
as well as the fundamental issues raised by the petition and answer. Where
the order directs a trial, either party who contends that the application should
have been granted or denied as a matter of law, should appeal from such
an order without awaiting the result of a hearing.49 Otherwise it may well
be argued that the order is a legal adjudication either that petitioner, if right
on the facts, is entitled to arbitration; or that respondent, if right on the
facts, is entitled to a denial of the motion.
Such an order directing a trial is intermediate 5o and subject to the
appellate restrictions applicable in various jurisdictions to intermediate orders.
An order which definitely grants or refuses arbitration is, however, a final
order."
Before leaving the subject of court proceedings preliminary to the arbi-
tration itself, it should be noted that a party who objects to an arbitration
instituted without court order need not, at least under the New York statute,
await the entry of the award to raise his objections. He may stop the pro-
ceedings at any stage by an application for a stay.52  Such application is the
reverse of a proceeding to compel arbitration. The same issues can be raised,
whether of law or of fact, and an order denying the application has the effect
of an order granting arbitration, and vice versa.
53
II
There are, of course, many variations in arbitration procedure. First
arises the question of the selection of the arbitrators, or under modern agree-
ments, of the arbitration tribunal. The old method, whereby each party
selected one arbitrator, and these two or a designated official selected the
third, is not to be recommended. Besides frequent difficulty in selection of
47. See Matter of Hosiery Mfg. Corp. v. Goldston, 238 N. Y. 22, 143 N. E. 779 (1924).
But cf. Petition of Jardine, Matheson & Co., 280 Pac. 397 (Cal. App. 1929).
48. Matter of Armstrong, Inc. v. Silverman, 214 App. Div. 6oi, 213 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1st
Dep't i925).
49. See cases cited supra note 40. See also Matter of Newburger v. Hatry Holding Corp.,
N. Y. L. J., March 21, 1934, at 136o, aff'd, 241 N. Y. App. Div. 853 (ist Dep't i934).
5o. See Matter of Newburger v. Gold, 255 N. Y. 532, 175 N. E. 301 (930).
51. Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F. (2d) IOO4 (C. C. A.
2d, 1933) ; Matter of Hosiery M fg. Corp. v. Goldston, 238 N. Y. 22, 143 N. E. 779 (924).
52. See N. Y. ARBITRATIoN LAW § 4-a; Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Gold-
berg, Maas & Co., Inc., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930). See also Kantner v. Bloom Co.,
Inc., I44 Misc. 6o2, 259 N. Y. Supp. 46 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Phillips, smepra note 7, 19 CORN. L.
Q. at 230-234.
53. See cases cited supra note 52.
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the umpire,5 4 this method has the disadvantage of making the two arbitrators
chosen by the parties advocates rather than judges " and thereby leaving the
decision to the umpire alone. A method of arbitration is needed by which all
the arbitrators will be unquestionably impartial.
This has been made possible by bodies such as the American Arbitration
Association and various chambers of commerce, which maintain permanent
panels of persons in all walks of life who are available for service as arbi-
trators. By use of the facilities of these organizations it is possible to obtain
three qualified arbitrators, no one of whom feels any allegiance to either
party. For the sake of convenience the method of choice adopted by the
American Arbitration Association will be-here described.
Upon receiving notice of the commencement of an arbitration-either
by written consent of the parties, by a court order, or by the request of one
of the parties pursuant to an agreement which names the association-the
American Arbitration Association sends to each of the parties or to their
attorneys a list of thirty names. The parties may strike off on this list any
names which they deem objectionable, and they may indicate preferences
among those remaining. The arbitrators, however, are chosen not by the
parties, but by the Association itself. It endeavors to choose them so that
there will always be one arbitrator representative of any class or industry
involved in the controversy.56 If not enough names remain on the list
returned by the parties, additional names are suggested. If one of the parties
does not return the list, the Association has the right under its rules to make
a selection from the names sent in by the other party. And if one of the
chosen arbitrators should be unable to attend, the association likewise has
the right to select a new arbitrator.
5 7
Where, however, the parties have not agreed upon the selection of the
arbitrators or upon a tribunal capable of choosing them, the court will make
the selection:58 And the court will, upon confirmation of the award, pass
upon the qualifications of the arbitrators, provided that an objection to fur-
ther proceedings is noted as soon as the facts raising the question of quali-
54. See, e. g., Tutein, Inc. v. Hudson Valley C. & P. Corp., 249 N. Y. 84, I62 N. E. 592
(1928); Matter of Buck, Kiaer & Co.. Inc. v. Hartmann & Co., Inc., 243 N. Y. 591, 154 N.
E. 618 (1926); Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252) N. Y. 284, 169 N. E.
386 (1929).
55. See the statement of Judge Pound in Matter of American Eagle Ins. Co. v. New
Jersey Co., Inc., 240 N. Y. 398, 405, 148 N. E. 562, 564 (1925) : ". . . the practice of arbi-
trators of conducting themselves as champions of their nominators is to be condemned as con-
trary to the purpose of arbitrations, and as calculated to bring the system of enforced arbitra-
tion into disrepute."
56. That a stockbroker might be an arbitrator in a case involving other stockbrokers
was decided in Matter of Newburger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 24o N. Y. Supp. 436 (xst
Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 546, 173 N. E. 859 (1930).
57. See the rules of the American Arbitration Association for the American Arbitration
Tribunal, particularly Rules IV and V.
58. See cases cited supra note 55. Most statutes have provisions on this subject: N. Y.
ARBITRATION LAW § 4; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 251, § 15; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 5, § 164; 43 STAT. 884 (1925), 9 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1927) ; UNIFoRM ARBITRATION
Acr §3.
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fication have been ascertained.59 In at least one case the issue was raised in
advance of the award by an application to compel the objecting party to
proceed with the hearings before the disputed arbitrator. 0
The American Arbitration Association usually arranges a date for
hearing after conference with the parties and the arbitrators. An hour is
set convenient to both parties concerned. Under this procedure it is possible
to hold a hearing within two weeks of the initiation of proceedings and to
continue thereafter without any loss of time on the part of the parties or
their counsel. In many instances one full afternoon session disposes of the
matter. Sometimes the arbitrators retire and announce their award imme-
diately. At other times the arbitrators meet subsequent to the hearing. And,
of course, there are more complicated cases in which numerous hearings are
necessary.
For the conduct of the hearings there are few precise statutory pro-
visions. Many states require that the arbitrators take an oath,;' but this pro-
vision may be waived.62  It is essential that the hearing be on notice so that
59. In general it is held that grounds for objection, known before the hearings were com-
menced, are waived if the parties continued with the arbitration. Wechsler v. Gidwitz, 250 Ill.
App. 136 (1928) ; Thomajanian v. Odabshian, 272 Mass. 19, 172 N. E. 232 (193o) ; Matter of
Newburger v. Rose, 228 App. Div. 526, 240 N. Y. Supp. 436 (Ist Dep't 193o), aft'd, 254 N.
Y. 546, 173 N. E. 859 (193o) ; Putterman v. Schmidt, 209 Wis. 442, 245 N. W. 78 (1932).
Disqualification has been held to exist in the following cases: Schwartzman v. London-Lan-
cashire Fire Ins. Co., 318 Mo. lO89, 2 S. W. (2d) 593 (1928) (one arbitrator as an officer and
stockholder in corporation whose employees, acting as agents for one of the parties, turned
over to the corporation commissions they had earned) ; Matter of Friedman, 215 App. Div.
130, 213 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Ist Dep't 1926) (one arbitrator accepted loan from a party while
proceedings were pending) ; In re Albert, 146 Misc. 811, 262 N. Y. Supp. 795 (Sup. Ct.
1932) (office associate of petitioner held disqualified) ; American Guarantee Co. v. Caldwell,
72 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) (business relationship with one of the parties held suf-
ficient ground for disqualification). However, it was held no disqualification that an arbi-
trator gave an affidavit to one of the parties after the award had been rendered: Everett v.
Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; or that he had subsequently been
employed by one of the parties: Matter of Robins Silk Mfg. Co. v. Consolidated Piece Dye
Works, 251 N. Y. 87, 167 N. E. 181 (1929) ; or that one of the arbitrators was an officer of
a large corporation which did business with one of the parties: Matter of Meinig Co. v. Kata-
kura & Co., Ltd., 241 App. Div. 406 (tst Dep't 1934).
6o. In re Albert, 146 Misc. 811, 262 N. Y. SUpp. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
61. Such is the New York requirement. CIv. PRAcT. ACT (Cahill, 1931) § 1452. Neither
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania nor the United States has a like requirement; nor does the Uni-
form Arbitration Act so provide. In New Jersey while the old law required an oath, it has
been held that the adoption of the arbitration statute, which itself did not contain such require-
ment, rendered an oath unnecessary. City of Rahway v. Cleary, IO N. J. Misc. 545, 159 At.
813 (Sup. Ct. 1932) aft'd, lO9 N. J. L, 348, 162 Atl. 590 (1932), sub norn. Rahway Valley
Joint Meeting v. Cleary; see also Hall County v. Smith, 178 Ga. 212, 172 S. E. 645 (934),
where the court held that the oath was not necessary unless required by the agreement.
Where the oath is required by law its failure is a fatal defect unless waived. See E. V. Ben-
jamin Co., Inc. v. Royal Mfg. Co., 172 La. 965, 136 So. ig (931) ; Matter of Horowitz v.
Kaplan, 248 N. Y. 547, 162 N. E. 519 (1928). For an example of strict compliance with re-
quirements see Sisson v. Pittman, 113 Ga. 166, 38 S. E. 315 (90l).
62. See City of Carlyle v. Village of Beckemeyer, 243 Ill. App. 46o (1927) ; Bridgeman
& Holtzman v. Gondek, 235 App. Div. 129, 256 N. Y. Supp. 491 (2d Dep't 1932). The latter
case holds that the provision in the New York statute requiring a waiver in writing' is not
jurisdictional, so that where the fact of waiver is not disputed it may be proved otherwise
than by a writing.
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the parties may present proof.G3 But in some states, this requirement can
be dispensed with in the submission agreement,64 or wili be deemed inappli-
cable according to circumstances. 5  Hearings may not be held on Sunday if
objecion is taken.60
In an arbitration proceeding, the usual steps necessary in a law suit in
preparation for trial have no place. It has been held that a party may have
neither a bill of particulars,6 7 nor an examination before trial or discovery.6
These remedies are conducive to delays and formalities which are inconsistent
with arbitration. Injustice seldom, if ever, results from their denial, since
arbitrators have wide powers to require such disclosure of facts as may be
necessary. In most states, however, a commission may issue to take the
testimony of absent witnesses. 9 The extent to which provisional remedies,
such as attachment and injunction, may be obtained has not been adjudicated,
although some statutes have express provisions on this subject.70
At the hearing before the arbitrators it is customary, but perhaps not
essential, to have the witnesses sworn. 71 Although frequently arbitrations
are conducted without the presence of attorneys, the parties, unless they have
63. This has been generally held to be the law whether or not the statute expressly so pro-
vides. See Stockwell v. Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Providence, 134 Cal. App. 534,
25 P. (2d) 873 (933) ; Modern System Bakery v. Salisbury, 215 Ky. 23o 284 S. W. 994
(1926) ; Second Society o~f Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd., 221 Mass. 518, iog N. E.
384 (1915) ; Kopp v. Grobert, 172 At. 733 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1934).
64. See Hall County v. Smith, 178 Ga. 212, 172 S. E. 645 (934).
65. See National Surety Co. v. Board of Education of Clifton, ii N. J. Misc. 225, I65
Atl. 288 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (requirement inapplicable because the arbitrators were chosen to
determine as experts a single fact) ; Jacob v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 136 Ore. 622, 297
Pac. 848 (ig3i) (inapplicable since the evidence was submitted in writing and necessity for
a hearing not suggested until after award).
66. Matter of Picker, 13o App. Div. 88, 114 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Ist Dep't igog).
67. Smyth v. Board of Education, 128 Misc. 49, 217 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
68. Matter of Isador Schwartz, 127 Misc. 452, 217 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. I925).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930), tit. 5, § 167; UNiFORm AR~rTmATiox AcT § ii. In
New York the same result was reached after amendment to the Arbitration Law which makes
an arbitration a special proceeding. See Matter of Interocean Mercantile Corp., 207 App.
Div. 164, 201 N. Y. Supp. 753 (ist Dep't 1923).
70. See CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5855; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 10, § 3;
UIFoRm A ImRArloN AcT § 12 (see note 4 supra, for states which have adopted this Act) ;
the federal act, 43 STAT. 884 (925), 9 U. S. C. A. § 8 (927), permits the filing of a libel
in admiralty cases. In New York it was held, over the dissent of Judge Cardozo, that the
filing of a mechanic's lien operated as a waiver' of the right to arbitration. See Young v.
Crescent Development Co., 24o N. Y. 244, 148 N. E. 510 (925). The legislature then
promptly amended the law. See N. Y. LmN LAw (Supp. 1934) § 35. There can be no doubt
that all states having modem arbitration statutes should permit the use of provisional reme-
dies. The Illinois statute on this subject, supra, is very comprehensive.
71. The New York law on this subject is in some uncertainty. In Dater and McMurray
v. Wellington, i Hill 319 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), the failure to swear witnesses was held to
be a mere irregularity. In Matter of Grening v. Malcolm, 74 Hun. 62, 26 N. Y. Supp. 117
(Sup. Ct. 1893) the court assumed that it was necessary to swear witnesses. However, m
Hano v. Isaac H. Blanchard Co., '99 N. Y. Supp. 227 (1922),. the Appellate Term, First
Dep't, held that the New York statute on the subject did not require that witnesses be sworn.
In Pennsylvania the statute is otherwise: PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 5, § 166. Local
statutes should be consulted on this subject. In any case, however, the swearing of witnesses
may be waived: Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581 (1878) ; Hano v. Isaac H. Blanchard Co.,
supra.
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agreed otherwise, have a right to their presence. 7 2  Accordingly, an award
may be set aside if, on appearance of one of the parties with counsel, the
arbitrators refuse an adjournment to the other, sought so that he may obtain
counsel also.73
It is not necessary that a stenographic record be kept unless required by
statute. 74  In the usual case the presence of a stenographer is undesirable,
as it tends to slow up the proceedings and to suggest to counsel unfamiliar
with arbitration methods the technicalities of an ordinary law suit. How-
ever, if the hearings are likely to continue for a period of time it is advisable
to have minutes kept to which counsel and the arbitrators can refer. And,
of course, in rare cases when a dispute arises after the award as to what
transpired during the hearings, the absence of minutes may prove embar-
rassing.
Arbitrators are not bound by rules of evidence, 75 and objections are,
therefore, usually futile unless a line of inquiry is being pursued which is so
obviously irrelevant or cumulative that an objection may be successfully
interposed in order to save time. The arbitrators are, however, required to
hear any testimony which is offered and which appears to be relevant, so that
an award will be set aside should they fail to allow its production or should
they refuse an adjournment for such a purpose."' The arbitrators may
bring to their decision their knowledge of trade conditions.7 7  They may,
with the consent of the parties, examine in their absence property involved
in the controversy;7s but they may not in the absence of one party hear
evidence from another, nor, without the consent of the parties, may they
seek out information on their own account.
79
In general attorneys should be prepared with all their witnesses and
documents at the first hearing, as arbitrators often come right to the heart
of the controversy and cover much more ground than is possible in an
72. See Wechsler v. Gidwitz, 250 Ill. App. 136 (1928). It has been held otherwise where
it did not appear that any prejudice resulted: Gardner v. Newman, 135 Ala. 522, 33 So. 179
(1902) ; Pennsylvania Iron Works Co. v. St. Louis Ice and Cold Storage Co., 96 Mo. App.
563, 70 S. W. 903 (19o2) ; Dodge v. Brennan, 59 N. H. 138 (I879) This also is a right
which may be waived. See Gardner v. Newman, supra.
73. Matter of Picker, 13o App. Div. 88, 114 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Ist Dep't 19o9).
74. Matter of Anderson Trading Company, Ltd. v. Brimberg, 119 Misc. 784, 197 N. Y.
Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Local statutes should, however, be consulted.
75. Dana v. Dana, 26o Mass. 46o, 157 N. E. 623 (1927) ; Koepke v. E. Liethen Grain Com-
pany, 205 Wis. 75, 236 N. W. 544 (1931). See Phillips, supra note 7, 82.U. OF PA. L. REv.
230 ff.
76. Rexburg Investing Co. v. Dahle & Eccles Construction Co., 36 Idaho 552, 211 Pac.
552 (1922) ; Second Society of Universalists v. Royal Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 518, io9 N. E. 384
(1915) ; Dickens v. Luke, 2 S. W. (2d) 161 (Mo. App. 1928) ; Itoh & Co., Ltd. v. Boyer Oil
Co., Inc., 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N. Y. Supp. 290 (ISt Dep't 1921) ; Giannopulos v. Pappas,
8o Utah 442, 15 P. (2d) 353 (1932). See also Matter of Newburger v. Ross, 235 App. Div.
833 (Ist Dep't 1932).
77. The Guldborg, i F. Supp. 38o (S. D. N. Y. 1932) ; Koepke v. E. Liethen Grain Co.,
205 Wis. 75, 236 N. W. 544 (1931).
78. Matter of Robins Silk Mfg. Co. v. Consolidated Piece Dye Works, 251 N. Y. 87, 167
N. E. 181 (1929).
79. Berrizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (925).
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ordinary law suit. Opening remarks are usually encouraged for the purpose
of fully informing the arbitrators as to the contentions of the parties,
although if a statement of claim has been filed, these may already have been
disclosed. It is seldom that the arbitrators will require briefs or closing
arguments. For that reason it is frequently advisable for counsel to point
out the purpose of testimony as it is offered. It is usual for the attorneys
to remain seated while questioning the witnesses and addressing the arbi-
trators, thus maintaining comparative informality.
In some jurisdictions, arbitrators are not bound by the rules of sub-
stantive law but are only required to decide according to their ideas of what
is right and just.80 References to statutes and decisions of the courts are
therefore of little value, except in so far as they are well known and declara-
tory of general public policy. Counsel, accordingly, should concentrate on
the equities in presenting the case and should endeavor to simplify the
presentation of the facts as much as possible. It should be observed, how-
ever, that in some states questions of law may be submitted to the court for
an advisory opinion during the pendency of the arbitration,"' and that in
some of these states as well as in others the court will upon motion to confirm
the award review errors of law committed by the arbitrators.
8 2
Unless a definite time for the rendition of the award be fixed,8 3 whether
in the submission agreement, the court order, or the rules of the tribunal,
there seems to be no restriction upon the length of time the arbitrators may
take for their decision except in certain statis.-4  However, decisions are
usually rendered very quickly after the termination of the hearings. No
80. See Itoh & Co., Ltd. v. Boyer Oil Co., Inc., 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N. Y. Supp. 29o
(Ist Dep't 1921) ; Matter of Pine Street Realty Co., Inc. v. Coutroulos, 233 App. Div. 404,
253 N. Y. Supp. 174 (ist Dep't i93i). See also The Hartbridge, 62 F. (2d) 72 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932) ; Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 198 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1923). In Matter
of Wilkins, 169 N. Y. 494, 62 N. E. 575 (i9o2), the court held that even though the only
question was one of law nevertheless it would not be reviewed.
81. Such is the rule in several states. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5847; ILL. REV. STAT.
(Cahill, 1933) c. IO, §6; MAss. GEN. LAWs (1932) c. 251, §20; NEv. Comn'. LAWS (Hillyer,
1929) § 522; N. C. CODE (1931) § 898 (M); PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 5, § 177;
UTAH REv. STAT. (1933) tit. 104, c. 36, § 13; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) c. 7, § 113. For an
application of one of these statutes see Boston Molasses Co. v. Molasses Distributors Corp.,
274 Mass. 589, 175 N. E. 150 (931). Mr. Phillips, supra note 7, 47 HARv. L. REV. at 6og-
61g, advocates an extension of the practice of permitting the courts to pass on questions of law
during an arbitration.
82. As, for instance, in Illinois [IL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 10, § II], 'Massachu-
setts [MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) C. 251, § IO], Minnesota [MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 9517], Nebraska [NEa. ComP. STAT. (1929) c. 20, § 2115], Washington [WASH. Rsv. STAT.
(Remington, 1932) § 424]. Some states also permit the review of questions of law, either
where the submission provided that the arbitrators should decide according to law, or where
it appears that the arbitrators intended to decide according to law. See Phillips, supra note
7, 47 HARv. L. Ray. at 602-604.
83. When such time is fixed a party may, after the expiration of such time, terminate the
proceedings before an award has been made. See Willis Finance & Construction Co. v. Por-
ter, 88 Cal. App. 523, 263 Pac. 842 (1928).
84. Local statutes should be consulted. Where a time limitation exists a waiver will be
inferred either by participating in the hearings after the expiration of the time: Andrews v.
Jordan, 205 N. C. 618, 172 S. E. 319 (1934) ; or by acceptance of part of the award: Ames
Canning Co. v. Dexter Seed Co., 195 Iowa 1285, 19o N. W. 167 (1922).
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particular form is required for the award itself, except that in many juris-
dictions it must be acknowledged by all the arbitrators who have accepted it. 5
The award should be as simple as the nature of the case permits and should
be preferably merely a general finding that party A has no claim against
party B, or that party A is entitled to recover from party B a fixed sum of
money or specific property, as the case may be. It is unwise for the arbi-
trators to state reasons in their awards. Such practice has sometimes led to
the rejection of the awards.8 6 Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
award need not be unanimous.8 7  And an award may be rendered even if
only one of the parties attended the hearings, provided notice was duly given
to the other.s8
The arbitrators may award themselves fees, which, however, are subject
to scrutiny by the court."9 They may also apportion the costs of the arbitra-
tion among the parties as they see fit,90 but unless specifically authorized to
do so they may not award counsel fees to the successful party.91 The award,
signed and acknowledged by the majority of the arbitrators, should be deliv-
ered to the successful party or filed in court.
92
Perhaps a word should be said about the expense of arbitration pro-
ceedings. When the arbitrators are privately selected their fees are a matter
of agreement and have sometimes been unnecessarily large.93 The various
85. See Gibson v. Burroughs, 41 Mich. 713, 3 N. W. 200 (1879) ; Matter of Grening v.
Malcolm, 74 Hun. 62, 26 N. Y. Supp. iH7 (Sup. Ct. 1893). Local statutes should, however,
be consulted. At common law where the submission was oral the award might be oral. See
Moore v. Collins, 24 N'. M. 235, 173 Pac. 547 (xgi8) ; Gay v. Waltman, 89 Pa. 453 (1879).
86. In jurisdictions following the rule that an award will be set aside where arbitrators
showed they intended to follow a rule of law and ,failed properly to do so, the indication of
the grounds upon which the award was arrived at may result in its vacation. See Fudickar
v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 392 (1875) ; Moore v. Luckess, 23 Gratt. i6o (Va.
1873) ; Mathews v. Miller and Quarrier, 25 W. Va. 817 (i885). In the last case, however,
the award was upheld because the error was on a doubtful point. On the other hand, in Cor-
rigan v. Rockefeller, 67 Ohio St. 354, 66 N. E. 95 (i9o2), the award was not vacated because
of the fact that the opinion of the arbitrators was filed separately. See Phillips, supra note 7,
47 HARv. L. REV. at 6o3-6o4.
87. This is generally provided by statute. See Matter of American Eagle Fire Ins. Com-
pany v. N. J. Ins. Co., 24o N. Y. 398, 148 N. E. 562 (1925) ; Pittsburgh Union Stock Yards
Co. v. Pittsburgh Joint Stock Yards Co., 3o9 Pa. 314, 163 Atl. 668 (1932). In both of these
cases it was held that an attempt by one of the arbitrators to prevent an award by a with-
drawal after the conclusion of the taking of evidence was ineffectual.
88. Many statutes expressly so provide. See supra note 24.
89. See James v. Southern Lumber Co., 153 Mass. 361, 26 N. E. 995 (i89i) ; Matter of
Blaikie, 119 Misc. 791, i98 N. Y. Supp. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 2o6 App. Div. 74o, I99 N.
Y. Supp. 911 (2d Dep't 1923). If the award is vacated on. grounds other than the miscon-
duct of the arbitrators they are entitled to receive their fees. See Shaw v. Gwin, i54 So. 392
(La. App. '934) ; Everett v. County of Erie, 148 Misc. 778, 266 N. Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct.
1933). The arbitrators are not allowed interest on their fees except from the date of the
entry of the judgment on the award. The Hartbridge, 57 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 2d, i932).
9o. New York Lumber Co. v. Schneider, ii9 N. Y. 475, 24 N. E. 4 (1890) ; Young v.
Shook, 4 Rawle 299 (Pa. 1833).
91. Warner v. Collins, 135 Mass. 26 (1883) ; Matter of General Footwear Corp. v. A. C.
Lawrence Leather Co., 233 App. Div. 665, 249 N. Y. Supp. 852 (ist Dep't 1931).
92. These matters are generally regulated by statute.
93. The classic case on this subject is Electrical Research Products,, Inc. v. Vitaphone
Corp., 171 AtI. 738 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1934). In Everett v. County of Erie, 148 Misc. 778, 266
N. Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1933) a fee of $6,ooo was upheld even though the award was va-
cated for errors of law.
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arbitration tribunals have schedules of fees, sometimes dependent upon the
amount in controversy. The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York pays both its arbitrators and a stenographer and, therefore, requires a
mini:.,um deposit of sixty dollars from each party, some of which is returned
if there is but one hearing of moderate length. The American Arbitration
Association, which does not require a stenographer and does not pay its
arbitrators, charges a minimum fee of five dollars per side, but makes no
refund. For additional hearings or in cases which involve large amounts
further sums are required.
While the fees required in arbitration proceedings are somewhat larger
than the fees which a plaintiff need pay to place a case upon the calendar,
and are also larger than the fee which a defendant must pay if he asks for a
jury trial, it is probable that, all things considered, the costs of arbitration
are far smaller than those of litigation. The saving in time alone for both
counsel and witnesses is a large item on the credit side of arbitration. And
considerable sums are also saved by the impossibility of appealing from the
award on the merits. 94 There can be no doubt that the great increase in the
use of arbitration tribunals during recent years is proof that the business
community finds arbitration less expensive and more satisfactory than litiga-
tion in a good proportion of cases.
III
At the end of the arbitration, as prior to its commencement, statutory
provisions govern. In some states the award is made a judgment of the
court as a matter of course 95 and in others it may be confirmed or vacated
by summary proceedings initiated by either party. Except in the case already
referred to, where no consent to arbitration has been given nor any order
obtained in advance, the right to compel arbitration cannot be litigated on the
application to confirm the award,9 6 nor, as already noted, can the merits be
reviewed.
7
It is customary, although not necessary, for the successful party to move
to confirm. Where the award grants no affirmative relief to the successful
party, such a motion may be unnecessary, since most laws limit the time in
94. But see discussion supra note 82.
o5. See, e. g., CAL. CODE OF Civ. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 1289; FLA. CoMP. LAWS (1927)
§456o; IDAHO CODE (1932) § 13-906; MONT. REV. CODES (1921) § 9977.
96. See note 27 supra. For a discussion of the enforceability of an award rendered in a
foreign jurisdiction see Phillips, supra note 7, 19 CORN. L. Q. at 226-230.
97. See cases cited supra note 8o. Under certain statutes questions of law can be re-
viewed; see notes 81 and 82 supra. In South Carolina the statute permits a review of the
facts and the law by a judge sitting without a jury. S. C. CODE (1932) § 7041. In Texas the
statute authorizes the parties to reserve a right to appeal in their submission agreement, in
which case the defeated party can have a new trial of the entire matter as an ordinary action.
TEx. STAT. (1928) tit. I0, arts. 233, 234.
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which a motion may be made to reject.98 Consequently, the party who has
had a claim against him disallowed may be better advised to do nothing, in
the hope that the other side may fail to move for rejection within the time
allowed. However, the party in whose favor an affirmative award has been
rendered must, in order to carry that award into effect, obtain an order of
confirmation. And he should remember that he also has but a limited period
of time in which to do this."'
The application to confirm or reject need not in some jurisdictions be
made by personal service, since it is treated as a continuation of the arbitra-
tion itself. Consequently, service on attorneys who have appeared at the
arbitration is sufficient, or if there were no such attorneys, service may be
made on the opposing party by mail or by any other method permitted for
the service of papers in a litigation. 0 A motion to confirm need contain
little besides a reference to the holding of the arbitration. It is generally
essential to submit as part of the motion the original award, the agreement
and other papers as well. 10 1
An award may be vacated on certain general grounds, such as fraud,
partiality, misconduct or evident error. 10 2  Whoever desires to upset an
award must make specific allegations of fact sufficient to show a case within
one of the grounds recognized by the statutes. 10 3  If the motion to confirm
is made before the time has expired in which the defeated party might move
to reject, the latter must, in answer to the motion to confirm, set forth any
objections he may have. 0 4  However, in some states, since the judgment
of confirmation is a mere formality, this rule does not apply, and the defeated
98. This is generally fixed at three months. See UNIFOR.MN ARB1TATIoN Acr § 18; N.
Y. CIv. PRACT. ACT § 1459; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930), tit. 5, § 173. But in Florida
the period is 30 days, FLA. CoMsP. LAWS (1927) § 4557. In American Guarantee Co. v. Cald-
well, 72 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934), the court affirmed the vacating an award because
of the improper selection of one of the arbitrators although no motion had been made to con-
firm the award, and the motion to vacate was made after the expiration of the three-month
period fixed in the statute.
99. This period is generally one year. See MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 251, § i9; N. Y.
Civ. PRAcr. ACT § 1456; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 5, § 169. In the Uniform Act
§ 3, however, the period is three months. Local statutes should be consulted to be sure of "the
exact limitation which is applicable.
Ioo. See Phillips, suprac note 7, 19 CORN. L. Q. at 229, 230, n. 126, for a list of statutes
not requiring personal service. In New York the Civil Practice Act § 1456 expressly pro-
vides that notice of the application to confirm must be served as a notice of motion might be
'served in an action. This section is not, however, applicable to awards made under the laws
of another state. See Matter of United Artists Corp. v. Gottesman, 135 Misc. 92, 236 N. Y.
Supp. 623 (Sup. Ct. 1929). It should be noted that the decision rested upon the authority of
a case decided prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y.
348, 174 N. E. 7o6 (1931). See on this subject Phillips, supra note 7, 19 CORN. L. Q. at
227-228.
IOI. See UNIFORM ARBITRATIoN AcT § 20.
io2. The grounds for vacation are similar in most of the statutes. See Phillips, su~pra
note 7, 47 HARv. L. REv. at 598.
lO3. See Tinsley v. Maddox, 176 Ga. 471, 168 S. E. 297 (1933) ; Thompson v. Edwards,
220 Ky. 239, 294 S. W. 1095 (1927).
1O4. The Hartbridge, 57 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
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party may move to vacate within the time allowed him by law."0 5 But when
a defeated party has let his time to vacate go by he may, according to some
authorities, nevertheless urge any grounds which exist for upsetting the
awar1. in opposition to a motion to confirm it.
10 6
The issues raised on a motion to confirm or vacate are usually deter-
mined by the court as on any other motion, although a few states provide for
the framing of issues and a trial.107 Even in states which have no such pro-
vision the court might order a reference in order to save its own time. In
these proceedings affidavits or testimony of an arbitrator are admissible to
show what matters were considered,' 08 but not to establish acts which might
vitiate the award'10 9
Under certain circumstances the award may be modified, as where there
has been an error of computation."10 In some cases the award will be sent
back to the same arbitrators for correction, but more often if a new hearing
is ordered it will be before different arbitrators.
As practically all statutes provide for entry of judgment upon an award
if the formalities have been complied with, it is somewhat amazing to find
high authority denying the right to obtain such judgment solely because the
submission agreement did not expressly authorize the entry of judgment."'
While the Supreme Court of the United States refused to review this ruling,
it is to be hoped that if opportunity arises that Court will not sanction so
illiberal a construction of the United States Arbitration Act.
Appeals may be taken from orders vacating awards, but not, in some
jurisdictions, from orders of confirmation, as in such cases it is the judgment
rather than the order which forms the proper basis for appeal. 1' 2 A different
1O5. See Utah Construction Co. v. Western Pacific Ry., 174 Cal. 156, 162 Pac. 631
(1917) ; Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 49 Idaho 303, 288 Pac.
641 (1930).
io6. In Shores v. Bowen, 44 Mo. 396 (1869), and Missouri Bridge & Iron Co. v. Pacific
Lime & Gypsum Co., 29o Mo. 170, 234 S. W. 797 (I92I), the right to object was limited to
grounds appearing on the face of the motion. But irt Hinkel v. Harris, 34 Mo. App. 223
(i889), Matter of Picker, 13o App. Div. 88, 114 N. Y. Supp. 289 (ist Dep't igog), and Mat-
ter of Conway v. Roth, 179 App. Div. io8, 166 N. Y. Supp. 182 (ist Dep't 1917), it was held
permissible to oppose the award on any grounds allowed by the statute. See doubts expressed
in The Hartbridge, 57 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), and Matter of Wilkins and Allen, 169
N. Y. 494, 62 N. E. 575 (19o2).
lo7. In some jurisdictions a jury trial may be had on issues so raised. See Boyden v.
Lamb, 152 Mass. 416, 25 N. E. 6og (i89o) ; Bowden v. Crow, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 591 (1893).
See also GA. CoDE (1926) §§ 5049, 5050.
io8. See Stowe v. Mutual Home Builders' Corp., 252 Mich. 492, 233 N. W. 391 (193o);
Giannopulos v. Pappas, 8o Utah 442, 15 P. (2d) 353 (1932).
iog. See cases cited supra note io8, and also Bisnovich v. British America Assurance
Co., 1oo Conn. 240, 123 Atl. 339 (1924) ; Johns v. Security Ins. Company, 174 S. E. 215 (Ga.
App. 1934) ; Wechsler v. Gidwitz, 250 Ill. App. 136 (1928) ; Collins Carriage Co. v. German
American Ins. Co., 86 N. J. Eq. 53, 97 Atl. 726 (1916).
11O. See for instance UNIFORm ARBITRATION Acr § 17; N. Y. CIrv. PRAcr. AcT § 1458;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 5, § 169.
iii. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 5g F. (2d) 1O38 (App. D. C.
1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 626 (1932). Contra: City of Rahway v. Cleary, io N. J. Misc.
545, 159 AtI. 813 (1932), aff'd, 1O9 N. J. L. 348, 162 Atl. 59o (i932), stub norm 
Rahway Val-
ley Joint Meeting v. Cleary.
112. See Matter of Picker, 13o App. Div. 88, 114 N. Y. Supp. 289 (ist Dep't igog).
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rule applies, however, in those states in which the judgment of confirmation
is entered as a matter of course. 113 Orders vacating awards and judgments
of confirmation are, of course, final; whereas an order directing a new hear-
ing is intermediate only.
When the courts refuse to enter judgment summarily for failure to
comply with statutory requirements, nevertheless an action may, according
to the weight of authority, be instituted upon the award as though it orig-
inally had been a common law proceeding.1 14  In most jurisdictions such an
award has the same conclusive effect as foundation for an action or for a
plea in bar as though the proceeding had been statutory." 5 There is, how-
ever, difference of opinion in respect to the enforceability, even by action, of
an award obtained in a foreign arbitration when the defeated party had not
been served with process and had taken no part in the hearings."16
Conclusion
There seeems to be no satisfactory reason why all these differences in
procedure should be perpetuated. Why an agreement to arbitrate an existing
controversy should be more formal than an agreement to arbitrate future
controversies is difficult to understand. These formalities were evidently
required at a time when the courts were more reluctant to enforce arbitration
agreements than they are today. It is, therefore, suggested that the statutes
be simplified so that whatever form of agreement is deemed sufficient as the
basis for compelling arbitration of future controversies should also be suffi-
cient to permit the entry of judgment summarily when the agreement calls
for arbitration of an existing controversy. 117  In other words, one form of
agreement should be required; one summary method provided for securing
adherence to the agreement and enforcing any award which has been ren-
dered. Even in those states which do not enforce agreements for future
controversies, the law should be changed, simplifying the procedure neces-
sary to obtain the benefit of judgment by summary proceeding. While it
may not be advisable to give parties the benefit of compulsory processes on
113. Supra note io5.
114. See Fuerst v. Eichberger, 224 Ala. 31, 138 So. 409 (i93i) ; Matter of Kreiss v.
Hotaling, 96 Cal. 617, 31 Pac. 740 (1892) ; Johns v. Security Ins. Co., 174 S. E. 215 (Ga.
App. 1934) ; Ames Canning Co. v. Dexter Seed Co., 195 Iowa 1285, i9o N. W. 167 (1922).
,1S. New York Lumber & Wood Working Co. v. Schneider, iig N. Y. 475, 24 N. E. 4
(i89o) ; Putterman v. Schmidt, 209 Wis. 442, 245 N. W. 78 (1932). In some jurisdictions it
is indicated that if a proceeding is commenced as a statutory proceeding it cannot be enforced
by action as though it had been a common law proceeding: Franks v. Battles, 147 Ark. 169,
227 S. V. 32 (i92i); Wright, Graham & Co. v. Hammond, 41 Ga. App. 738, I54. S. E. 649
(I93O) (proceedings complied with statutes of a foreign jurisdiction) ; Cochrane v. Forbes,
:257 Mass. 135, 153 N. E. 566 (1926) ; see Phillips, supra note 7, 19 CORN. L. Q. at 228-230.
116. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 7o6 (193I), upheld the right to bring
such action in a case in which the parties agreed to arbitrate in a foreign country and the re-
quirements of that jurisdiction as to notice had been complied with; Shaffer v. Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Distributing Corp., 36 Ohio App. 31, 172 N. E. 689 (1929), denied the right to
bring such action at a time when there was no compulsory arbitration statute in Ohio. See
also Wright, Graham & Co. v. Hammond, 41 Ga. App. 738, 154 S. E. 649 (i93o); Phillips,
sitpra note 7, i9 CoRN. L. Q. at 227-228.
117. This is indeed now the case in all of the states listed supra note 6, except New York.
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agreements as informal as those recognized by the common law, nevertheless
if the parties have actually participated in the arbitration and an award has
been rendered, it is submitted that summary judgment should be permitted
regardless of the form of the agreement itself."s Parties who have not
participated in the arbitration can be adequately protected by a reservation
of the right to question the making of the agreement upon motion to confirm
the award. They can also be given the right to stay an arbitration on the
ground that no agreement exists. Such changes in the law would do much
to simplify arbitration procedure and to eliminate the possibility of decisions
as technical as some of those which have been rendered. Arbitration should
not be encumbered by technical rules. The time for being jealous of the
jurisdiction of the courts has passed.
It should, of course, be remembered that arbitration cannot be used in
all cases. It is a method peculiarly suitable to the determination of contro-
versies between persons in the same trade, where the facts are simple and
the hearings need not be extensive. Arbitration is of doubtful value when
the facts are so complicated that they cannot be easily carried in mind, so that
stenographer's minutes must be consulted and briefs must be written. Few
men can be found who will give consecutive time to a lengthy arbitration.
In such cases, accordingly, frequent adjournments tend to defeat one of the
chief purposes of arbitration: a final conclusion speedily arrived at.
The courts must, therefore, ever remain the chief forum for the deter-
mination of controversies. The difficulties in the way of delay and expense
which have driven the parties to arbitration can only be remedied by careful
thought on the part of bench and bar. Even when much needed reforms
shall have been accomplished, arbitration should continue to be favored as
an informal method of settling disputes. All the technical aspects which
have encumbered arbitration in the past should be removed, however, so that
less and less resort to the courts will be possible in connection with the
arbitration proceedings themselves.
118. The following is suggested as a provision which would cover the subject:
"An award may be confirmed and judgment entered thereon by summary motion
without any previous adjudication that there was an obligation to arbitrate. It shall not
be an objection to the confirmation of such award that there was no agreement between
the parties for arbitration, or that the agreement between the parties was not in
the form required by statute, or that there was any failure on the part of the op-
posing party to comply with the provisions of the agreement requiring arbitration,
or that the arbitrators or any of them were not appointed pursuant to the agree-
ment, except as herein expressly provided. Any party who has in no respect participated
in such arbitration may raise any of the foregoing issues, either upon an appplication to
confirm or vacate the award or by a motion for a stay of the arbitration which, if a
notice shall have been personally served upon him of an intention to conduct the arbitra-
tion, must be initiated within ten days thereafter. Where such party sets forth evi-
dentiary facts indicating the existence of any such issue, a summary trial of the same shall
be had and such party shall have the right to demand a jury trial provided such demand
is served with his affidavits. In the event that such party is unsuccessful he may, never-
theless, participate in the arbitration if the same is still being carried on."
That a statute which prevents a party who has participated in an arbitration from ques-
tioning the jurisdiction of the arbitrators would be constitutional was intimated by Chief
Judge Cardozo in Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., Inc., 253
N. Y. 382, 393, 171 N. E. 579, 583 (1930).
